Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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The Preparatory Committee of the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should address the substantive items of the 1995 Conference during its third and fourth sessions. As a contribution to that examination, the following suggestions are submitted.

The NPT Review and Extension Conference of 1995 and its preparatory process offer an invaluable opportunity for the Parties to the Treaty to assess its functioning and to agree on a common strategy that will ensure its continuation and full compliance with its provisions.

The success of the 1995 Conference cannot be measured by the automaticity with which it is extended, but rather by the seriousness with which NPT Parties evaluate and resolve the present challenges in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

NPT Parties should identify specific measures aimed at strengthening the present regime and its full and comprehensive implementation on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. These include, among others, 1) a comprehensive nuclear test ban, 2) a prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, including stockpiles, and the phasing out of existing stockpiles, 3) full security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, 4) ensuring access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes for all the States Parties without exception, and 5) ensuring the universality of the Treaty.

The nuclear-weapon States should present, collectively or individually, their ideas regarding nuclear disarmament steps. In this regard, the point of departure should be a reaffirmation of their commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework and a target date for their total elimination. It would also be important that 1) the Russian Federation and the United States indicate the bilateral measures they will take in the future in order to reduce their nuclear arsenals beyond the levels envisaged in the START I and II agreements, and 2) the steps that China, France and the United Kingdom would be willing to take in light of the reductions referred to above.